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ABSTRACT 
 
The Challenges of Improving Revenue-Recognition Standard for Multiple-Element 
Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry (SOP 97-2). (May 2008) 
Anup Srivastava, B.Tech, IIT Delhi; M.B.A., University of Delhi 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Edward P. Swanson 
 
 I investigated whether implementing SOP 97-2, the revenue-recognition standard 
for the software industry, reduces earnings informativeness. This standard is particularly 
important for two reasons: First, its provisions coincide with provisions of SAB 101, the 
current general revenue-recognition standard. Second, the software industry provides a 
laboratory setting for examining multiple-element firms, whose revenue-recognition 
challenges keep mounting as more and more firms bundle multiple products and 
services. I found that implementing SOP 97-2 leads to additional revenue deferrals and a 
decline in earnings informativeness. However, the market prices these deferrals as 
revenues, as if these amounts had not been deferred.  Moreover, the proforma earnings, 
which I calculated by undoing the revenue deferrals, more strongly correspond with 
market returns than do the reported earnings. My findings indicate that the accounting 
numbers calculated using the pre-SOP 97-2 revenue-recognition rules more strongly 
correspond with market returns than do those calculated using SOP 97-2. My findings 
should interest FASB in its project on developing a new revenue-recognition standard. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  Revenue typically represents the largest and most value-relevant item in firms’ 
financial statements (FASB 2002). However, as more and more firms adopt a 
“relationship marketing” approach (Galbraith 2002, Ghosh and Balachander 2007) by 
bundling multiple products and services, revenue-recognition challenges keep mounting 
(FASB 2002). Consider a software firm that delivers its base software on the contract 
signing date and delivers integration services, maintenance, and software upgrades at 
different times over the next 24 months. How does this firm determine revenues at any 
time before the completion of this contract? Such a problem challenges both financial 
statement preparers and standard setters (FASB 2002) and has figured prominently in 
FASB’s deliberations on creating a new revenue-recognition standard (FASB/IASB 
2007).1 
The challenges of creating revenue-recognition standards for firms that bundle 
multiple products and services (the “multiple-element” firms) differ from those of other 
firms in at least one significant aspect – estimating revenues for partial deliveries of 
multiple-element firms requires greater subjective assessments. Consider the above 
example. How does this firm allocate aggregate contract value to individual elements 
that are not sold separately? And how does it decide whether a delivered element 
provides functional value to a customer pending delivery of another element? Estimating 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
 
1
 FASB’s advisory council has identified this agenda item as FASB’s highest priority project (FASAC 
2006). FASAC has also recommended a review of the software industry’s revenue-recognition rules. 
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revenues based on the concept of completion of the earnings process (SFAC No. 5) 
necessitates such assessments. 
Nevertheless, the current revenue-recognition standards impose strict objectivity 
and verifiability conditions rather than rely on managers’ subjective assessments. The 
current standards require that multiple-element firms should defer revenue recognition in 
its entirety even when firms have 1) delivered some elements substantially, but not 
completely; 2) delivered some elements completely, but cannot objectively apportion the 
contract value to these elements; and 3) delivered some elements completely, but cannot 
establish their functionality pending delivery of other elements. In this study, I examine 
whether such strict objectivity and verifiability conditions reduce multiple-element 
firms’ earnings informativeness.2 On the one hand, such conditions might improve the 
earnings informativeness of firms that had previously exploited relatively obscure 
verifiability conditions to front-load revenue recognition. On the other hand, this “all or 
nothing” approach can force a firm to defer its entire revenues even when it has partially 
or completely delivered elements of significant economic value. For example, the 
current rules preclude Apple Inc. from recognizing any revenue on the day it sells an 
iPhone.  
To investigate the effects of the multiple-element attribute of current standards, I 
examine the effects of implementing SOP 97-2, rather than those of implementing SAB 
                                                 
2
 This question remains unexamined. The current standards (i.e., SOP 97-2 [AICPA 1996] for the software 
industry and SAB 101[SEC 1999] for the other industries) affect firms’ revenue-recognition practices in 
two distinct ways: (1) through the completion of product-delivery requirement and (2) through additional 
compliance requirements for multiple-element contracts. Zhang (2005) examines the effects of the first 
aspect in isolation and Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber (2005) examine the simultaneous effects of both 
aspects. However, the distinct effect of the second aspect remains unexamined.    
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101. Although SEC enacted SAB 101 three years after AICPA enacted SOP 97-2 and the 
revenue-recognition requirements of SAB 101 virtually coincide with those of SOP 97-
2,3 I use the earlier standard for three reasons: first, SAB 101 codified the multiple-
element rules of SOP 97-2 and also introduced delivery and earnings-completion 
requirements to those industries that were not formally covered by these rules earlier.  
Therefore, empirical effects of implementing SAB 101 could arise from reasons other 
than its multiple-element attribute (Moffeit and Eikner 2003). In contrast, because SOP 
91-1, which preceded SOP 97-2, already required software firms to comply with 
delivery and earnings-completion based conditions, the empirical effects of 
implementing SOP 97-2 would arise only from its multiple-element attribute 
(Carmichael 1998).  
Second, software firms exemplify multiple-element firms. At a minimum, almost 
all software firms provide future updates, upgrades, and extended maintenance support 
in addition to base software. A significant number of software firms also provide 
additional services such as customization, integration, and training.  
Third, because SAB 101 applies rules originally designed for the software 
industry to other industries, some might argue that the SEC misapplied SOP 97-2 rules 
(FASB 2002). Specifically, AICPA created SOP 97-2 to prevent software firms from 
prematurely recognizing revenues from multiple-element contracts (Carmichael 1998). 
Therefore, implementing SOP 97-2 might improve software firms’ earnings 
                                                 
3
 Both SOP 97-2 and SAB 101 build upon the concepts of earnings process completion and revenue 
realizability (SFAC No. 5). Both require compliance with four necessary conditions before firms can 
recognize revenues: (1) a formal arrangement, (2) completion of delivery, (3) determinable fees, and (4) 
revenue realizability.  
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informativeness; nevertheless, this premise remains unexamined. While Altamuro et al. 
(2005) report a general decline in earnings informativeness upon implementing SAB 
101, their sample of SAB 101 affected firms is unlikely to include software firms 
because SOP 97-2 preceded SAB 101. 
I use three different research designs to examine my research question. First, I 
use a before-and-after design to examine whether the market returns more strongly 
correspond with pre-SOP 97-2 earnings or with SOP 97-2 implementation year’s 
earnings. I find that the market returns more strongly correspond with former than with 
latter, which suggests that implementing SOP 97-2 reduces earnings-returns association.  
My second research design controls for the possibility that the above inter-
temporal decline in earnings-returns association occurs due to factors other than the SOP 
97-2 implementation. I capitalize on balance sheet changes that result from 
implementing stringent SOP 97-2 rules – the additional revenue deferrals, which I call 
SOP 97-2-created deferrals. Under SOP 97-2 provisions, firms report these deferrals as 
unearned or deferred revenues (i.e., as a current liability). However, under the prior 
regime, firms would not have deferred these additional amounts and would have 
recognized them as revenues. Therefore, I examine: Does the market price SOP 97-2-
created deferrals as revenues (consistent with the prior regime) or as current liabilities 
(consistent with SOP 97-2)? Unlike the before-and-after design, this design enables me 
to directly compare the two accounting methods using only the implementation year 
data.  I find that the market prices the SOP 97-2-created deferrals as revenues and not as 
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current liabilities. This finding supports the notion that the market prices earnings as if 
the prior accounting regime still prevails and SOP 97-2 had not been implemented. 
I provide further evidence on the above notion by using a third research design. I 
examine whether the proforma earnings (i.e., the earnings that would have been reported 
had SOP 97-2 not been implemented) are more informative than the reported earnings. I 
calculate proforma revenues and earnings by adding back SOP 97-2-created deferrals. I 
find that the proforma earnings more strongly relate with market returns than do the 
reported earnings.  
I contribute to the literature by documenting that SOP 97-2 reduces earnings 
informativeness of the software firms. My findings suggest that a standard that requires 
highly objective and verifiable support for multiple-element firms’ revenue assessments 
reduces earnings informativeness, perhaps because estimating revenues for such firms 
necessitates subjective assessments. My findings also dispel the notion that 
implementing the current general standard (i.e., SAB 101) in non-software industries 
reduces earnings informativess because the SEC misapplied SOP 97-2 rules to such non-
intended industries.  
My findings might interest the FASB in its revenue-recognition standard project 
(FASB/IASB 2007). Standard setters’ decisions often involve trade-offs between 
relevance and reliability. AICPA created SOP 97-2 to improve multiple-element firms’ 
earnings reliability by requiring such firms to defer revenues when they cannot 
objectively and verifiably determine the extent of completion of the earnings process. 
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My results suggest that a more timely recognition of such deferred amounts might 
convey more useful information to financial statement users.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background 
information on SOP 97-2, Section III develops the hypotheses, Section IV describes the 
sample, the research design, and the results, and Section V presents some concluding 
remarks. 
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON SOP 97-2 
Appendix A describes the changes in firms’ revenue recognition practices due to 
the implementation of SOP 91-1, SOP 97-2, and SAB 101. Each of these three revenue 
recognition standards builds upon the concept of completion of the earnings process 
(SFAC No. 5). However, only SOP 97-2 provides the ideal setting to examine the 
exclusive effects of the multiple-element attribute of current standards, because: 1) SOP 
91-1 did not include the current multiple-element rules; and 2) most of the SAB 101 
implementation effects arise from delivery-based revenue-recognition requirements, 
rather than from its multiple-element rules. For example, the most common changes 
from implementing SAB 101 include: 1) recognizing revenues for FOB goods only after 
a firm transfers title of goods, 2) recognizing research fees over the contracted period 
rather than upfront, and 3) recognizing revenues on layaways only after the customer 
takes possession of the goods. Because of these changes, the pharmaceutical industry is 
among the most SAB 101 affected industries (Moffeit and Eikner 2003; Altamuro et al. 
2005), even though pharmaceutical firms do not assume significant multiple-element 
obligations.  
In this section, I describe the circumstances that led to creation of SOP 97-2 and 
the reasons for its likely effects. In the mid 1990s, when many software firms were 
growing rapidly and reporting losses, investors began to rely on revenues rather than on 
earnings to value these firms (e.g., Damodaran 2002; Bowen, Davis, and Rajgopal 
2002). Stock prices frequently reacted even if a firm met its earnings target, but missed 
its revenue-growth target (Ertimur and Livnat 2003). Consequently, some software firms 
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began to bend accounting rules to report higher revenues. Notably, some software firms 
would recognize entire revenues from a multiple-element contract even before they 
delivered all the contracted elements (Carmichael 1998).  The mid-1990s also witnessed 
numerous revenue-related accounting restatements (e.g., GAO 2003, Palmrose, Scholz, 
and Wahlen 2004). The SEC initiated enforcement actions against firms that recognized 
revenues prematurely (e.g., COSO 1999). As revenue recognition became the SEC’s 
priority, it requested that AICPA create stringent revenue recognition rules for the 
software industry. 
SOP 91-1, which specified the then applicable revenue-recognition rules, did not 
provide explicit guidance on when to recognize revenues for undelivered elements in a 
multiple-element contract. Specifically, the SOP 91-1 rules did not provide clear 
guidance on: 1) how to estimate “significance” of undelivered elements; and 2) how to 
account for software upgrades, which firms provide on a “when-and-if-available” basis. 
Since SOP 91-1 had become effective, most software firms had begun bundling more 
products and services in the same revenue arrangements by capitalizing on progress in 
internet and distributed computing technologies (Choi and Whinston 1999; Fuerderer et 
al. 1999). At a minimum, most software firms had begun providing extended 
maintenance support through online updates and upgrades. 
AICPA created SOP 97-2 to require software firms to defer recognizing a portion 
of revenues corresponding to their undelivered elements (MacDonald 1996). In order to 
achieve such revenue deferrals, AICPA added more elaborate and stringent conditions 
before firms could recognize revenues from multiple-element contracts. For example, 
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SOP 97-2 added a more stringent interpretation of the delivery condition and introduced 
a new vendor specific objective evidence (VSOE) requirement. The delivery condition 
requires that all other elements essential for the functioning of the delivered element 
should also have been delivered. The VSOE condition requires that a firm should first 
establish the fair value of each element based solely on the firm’s own pricing records.4 
Importantly, if a firm cannot establish fair value of just one element, the firm might not 
be able to objectively apportion the aggregate contract value to any other element. This 
might cause deferral of entire revenues from the contract (Carmichael 1998).  
The importance of these conditions can be illustrated using the example of the 
software firm described earlier. In order to recognize revenue for the base software on its 
delivery date, the firm should 1) establish each element’s fair value based on the firm’s 
own prior transactions and 2) ensure that the base software provides functional without 
additional services. If the firm cannot meet either of these two conditions, it should defer 
recognizing revenues corresponding to base software until (1) it meets both conditions; 
or (2) it delivers all other elements.5  
When AICPA issued an exposure draft of SOP 97-2 and invited comments, 
several respondents protested against VSOE and delivery conditions (see Appendix B  
                                                 
4
 The criteria used in practice to establish VSOE are stringent. A firm should provide evidence from at 
least 30 prior randomly selected transactions and 85% of such transactions should have been priced within 
15% of the median price (Sondhi 2006). This requirement is excessively stringent for firms that customize 
products, have high technological obsolescence rates, or use dynamic pricing. 
5
 Despite customers’ outcry, Apple Inc. recently asked its customers to pay a nominal fee of $ 1.99 to 
download a software patch for the computers it had sold earlier. Otherwise, its auditors would question its 
policy of not deferring a portion of revenues for an undelivered element. Earlier, Apple tried defending its 
accounting choice by claiming that it could not estimate fair values of future patches at the time of the 
original sale. However, in such situations, the current standard requires firms to defer entire revenues from 
the contract (Reily 2007). 
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for typical responses). For example, PWC stated, “VSOE of fair value will lead to 
deferral of all revenues, even in situations where software products having clear value 
and immediate utility to customer have been delivered.” An academician felt that 
requiring a firm to defer recognition of entire revenue from a multiple-element contract 
only because the firm could not meet just one criterion for just one element, amounts to 
“stopping all traffic on a freeway because one car is broken down.” Lucent said: 
“services compose between 1% and 15% of total revenue… the company would be 
forced to defer 100% of revenue until 100% of services were performed.” Massachusetts 
Society of CPAs called this an “all or nothing” approach. 
11 
 
 
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
As described above, in 1996, AICPA enacted SOP 97-2 to prevent multiple-
element software firms from recognizing revenues prematurely and to require them to 
defer recognizing a portion of revenues corresponding to their undelivered elements. In 
other words, SOP 97-2 requires firms to follow an element-by-element approach, by 
recognizing revenues for an element only after objectively and verifiably determining its 
completion of earnings process. This might improve earnings informativeness of firms 
that took advantage of relatively obscure rules of SOP 91-1 to prematurely recognize 
revenues.  
Nevertheless, as described earlier, SOP 97-2’s requirements characterize an “all 
or nothing” approach. This approach may force firms to defer revenue recognition in its 
entirety even when firms have partially or completely delivered elements of significant 
economic value. Furthermore, the rules of SOP 97-2 are so elaborate and comprehensive 
that they border on audit standard setting (Carmichael 1998).6 These elaborate rules may 
reduce accounting discretion that managers use to communicate value-relevant 
information (e.g., Healy and Wahlen 1999, Fields, Lys, and Vincent 2001). Indeed, 
Altamuro et al. (2005) find that implementing SOP 97-2 rules in a broader industry 
setting reduces earnings informativeness. I examine whether their finding holds in the 
software industry, that is: 1) in the multiple-element context and 2) in the industry for 
                                                 
6
 The underlying rules of SOP 97-2 are simple and intuitive. Nevertheless, their application to a variety of 
situations requires long and complex guidance. For example, KPMG’s and PWC’s technical guidance to 
assist software firms in implementing SOP 97-2 rules run 332 pages (KPMG 2005) and 500 pages (PWC 
2005) long.  
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which these rules were originally created. I test the following hypothesis using market 
association tests:7   
H1: Implementing SOP 97-2 leads to a decline in association between earnings 
and market returns. 
I examine the above question using a before-and-after design. However, this 
design suffers from a limitation: inter-temporal changes could arise from factors other 
than those due to the SOP 97-2 implementation.8 Business practices of high-tech firms 
have been highly susceptible to changes since the mid-1990s (e.g., McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson, 2007). In order to control for any inter-temporal effects, I directly examine 
whether the market prices the implementation year’s financial statement components 
consistent with the pre-SOP 97-2 or the post-SOP 97-2 method.  
Implementing SOP 97-2 leads to additional revenue deferrals (i.e., the SOP 97-2-
created deferrals) that firms report as current liabilities. However, based on the earlier 
accounting method, firms would not have deferred these additional amounts and would 
have recognized them as revenues. Accordingly, I examine whether the market considers 
SOP 97-2-created deferrals as revenues or as current liabilities, using the following 
hypothesis.   
                                                 
7
 Beaver (1972) suggests that “(the accounting) method which is more highly impounded (in securities 
prices) ought to be the method reported in financial statements.” Lev and Ohlson (1982) state that 
providing information for valuation should be accounting’s “desirable” property. Kothari (2001) defines 
earnings informativeness as the association between accounting earnings and market returns. Barth, 
Beaver, and Landsman (2001) suggest that examining how well accounting numbers relate with prices 
provides “fruitful insights” to standard setters.  
8
 For example, Zhang (2005) finds that passage of time improved earnings informativeness of the non-
SOP 91-1-affected control group (76% of her software-firms sample). To control for inter-temporal 
effects, both Zhang (2005) and Altamuro et al. (2005) use non-affected firm samples as control groups.  
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H2: The market prices SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues more similarly to 
how it prices revenues than to how it prices current liabilities. 
If the above test indicates that the market prices SOP 97-2-created deferrals as 
revenues and not as current liabilities, it might indicate that the market prices earnings as 
if SOP 97-2 had not been implemented. I directly examine this notion. First, I calculate 
proforma revenues by adding back SOP 97-2-created deferrals because absent SOP 97-2, 
these amounts would not have been deferred. Then, I assume that the software firms 
report costs that do not match revenues (Morris 1992, Zhang 2005, Mulford 2006).9  
Accordingly, I calculate proforma earnings by adding back SOP 97-2-created deferrals. 
Next, I examine whether the market returns more strongly correspond with proforma 
earnings (consistent with pre-SOP 97-2 method) than with reported earnings (consistent 
with SOP 97-2). I use the following hypothesis: 
H3: Proforma earnings are more strongly associated with market returns than 
are reported earnings. 
                                                 
9
 SFAS 86 (FASB 1985) allows a firm to capitalize its software development costs after it establishes 
software’ technological feasibility. Nevertheless, Mulford (2006) finds that on average, software firms 
expense more than 90% of their development costs in the period in which these costs are incurred. For 
example, despite deferring iPhone’s sales revenues, Apple expenses engineering, sales, and marketing 
costs as they are incurred. 
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IV.   SAMPLE SELECTION, RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Sample Selection  
  SOP 97-2 applies to all firms whose products contain a significant software 
component. Such firms belong to different industries and not just the software industry. 
However, to select my sample, I focused on firms in the software industry (having SIC 
codes beginning with 737) because SOP 97-2 definitely applies to these firms. Within 
these firms, I focused on pre-packaged software firms (SIC code 7372) and integrated 
software and services firms (SIC code 7373), which not only comprise more than 90% of 
all firms in the software industry, but routinely use multiple-element contracts.  The 
other smaller software sub-industries, which comprise the remaining 10% of software 
firms, might include pure services firms and might not reflect characteristics of multiple-
element firms. 
  I derived my sample from the Compustat database using the sample selection 
procedure described in Table 1. For testing H1, I assumed that firms implemented SOP 
97-2 rules in the same years as AICPA required them to do so (i.e., the “prescribed 
implementation years”).10 To the extent this assumption is violated, it would bias against 
my finding significant results. I needed data on changes in stock prices, sales, assets, and 
earnings for the following two years: the year prior to the implementation year and the 
implementation year. Therefore, I retained 408 firms with SIC codes 7372 and 7373 with 
                                                 
10
 Compustat defines fiscal year based on the month of May. However, SOP 97-2 defines prescribed 
implementation year based on a December cut-off. For firms with fiscal years ending in June through 
November, the prescribed implementation year corresponds to Compustat fiscal year 1999, and 1998 for 
the others. 
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valid data for each of the above variables for each of the three years ending with the 
implementation year. 
  To test H2 and H3, I hand-collected data on deferred-revenue accounts for the 
following four years: a) two years prior to the implementation year, to determine the 
“normal” level of firms’ deferred-revenue accounts; b) the implementation year; and c) 
the year after the implementation year. The SOP 97-2 implementation years could 
correspond to Compustat fiscal years 1998 or 1999, depending on firms’ fiscal year-end 
months. Hence, I retained 423 firms with SIC codes 7372 and 7373 with revenue and 
assets data available in Compustat for each of the fiscal years 1996-2000 (i.e., 1998−2 to 
1999+1).  
  For these 423 firms, I gathered data from the firms’ 10-K filings. I obtained data 
on deferred-revenue accounts from the liability section of balance sheets or from 
footnotes that provide details on smaller liabilities. I looked for words such as “deferred 
revenue,” “unearned income,” “customer advances,” and “billings in excess of revenue.” 
I further dropped 137 firms that did not provide details on deferred-revenue accounts. 
This filter left me with 286 firms.  
  Next, I examined the “revenue recognition” section in the “significant accounting 
policies” footnotes and also performed a keyword search for SOP 97-2, to determine the 
fiscal years in which firms first implemented the SOP 97-2 rules.11 I could not determine 
                                                 
11To ascertain the SOP 97-2 implementation year, I looked for explicit disclosures in firms’ 10-K filings. 
If a firm didn’t explicitly disclose its implementation year, I examined changes in its revenue-recognition 
policy.   
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implementation years for 35 firms, which left me with 251 firms that constitute my 
sample for testing H2 and H3.    
Normal and SOP 97-2-Created Deferred Revenue 
  I partitioned the implementation year’s deferred-revenue accounts into normal 
deferred revenue and SOP 97-2-created deferred revenue components. Deferred-revenue 
account refers to those cash receipts from customers, which pending conversion to 
revenues, are reported as liabilities. I assumed that (1) implementing SOP 97-2 did not 
affect firms’ cash operating cycles and (2) firms had incentives to recognize revenues 
early. Therefore, any increase in the deferred-revenue account in the SOP 97-2 
implementation year would likely reflect additional revenue-recognition restrictions. I 
calculated each firm’s deferred revenue to sales ratios for the two years prior to the 
implementation year. I called their average the normal ratio. Then, I multiplied each 
firm’s normal ratio with its reported revenue in the implementation year. I called this 
product the normal deferred revenue. This component represents the deferred-revenue 
account if SOP 97-2 had not been implemented. Then, I subtracted the normal deferred 
revenue from the reported deferred-revenue account, and called the residual the SOP 97-
2-created deferred revenue. Hence, I used firms’ own prior operating ratios to partition 
the deferred-revenue account into normal deferred revenue and SOP 97-2-created 
deferred revenue components.   
Descriptive Statistics 
  Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics of 408 firms (for testing H1) and 
251 firms (for testing H2 and H3) in the implementation year. I discuss the descriptive 
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statistics of 251 firms; those of the 408 firms are similar. Table 1 Panel B shows that the 
sample of 251 firms is comprised of 187 prepackaged software firms (75%) and 64 
systems integrators (25%). Table 1 Panel C shows that only 4 firms (2%) implemented 
SOP 97-2 earlier than the prescribed year; 219 (87%) implemented in the prescribed 
year; and the remaining 28 (11%) implemented later than the prescribed year (many 
firms restated their accounts due to late implementation). Table 1 Panel D shows that 
72% of the sample firms implemented SOP 97-2 in 1998, 23% in 1999, and the 
remaining 5% in 1997 and 2000. Table 2 Panel B shows that the sample firms had 
average assets of $ 337 million (median $50 million). However, they had much higher 
average market value of $ 1,966 million (median $ 85 million), which suggests that 
investors had high growth expectations from these firms. Note the high coefficient of 
variation (ratio of standard deviation to mean) that reaches 800% for some variables. 
This shows large variation in the sample firms’ characteristics. The average age of the 
firms was 12 years (median 11 years). However, firms’ revenues grew at an average rate 
of 46% (median 18%). The average ROA was negative and more than half of the sample 
firms incurred losses. The average SOP 97-2-created deferred revenue to assets 
(revenue) ratio was 1.66% (2.31%).  
Univariate Tests on Deferred-Revenue Accounts 
I first confirmed that implementing SOP 97-2 significantly increased software 
firms’ deferred revenues and that this increase did not reflect a time trend.  I used 
revenue (Compustat DATA 12) to deflate the deferred revenues because if the cash 
operating cycle remains unchanged, the deferred revenues should increase 
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proportionately with revenues. Nevertheless, I also used alternate deflators of assets 
(DATA 6) and market value (common shares outstanding [DATA25] × closing price 
[DATA199]).  
Table 3 Panel A shows that upon implementing SOP 97-2 rules, the deferred 
revenue to revenue ratio increased for approximately two-thirds of the sample firms. In 
value terms, this ratio increased by an average of 2.3% (calculated as Ratiot – Ratiot-1). 
This change, on average, represents a 42% increase over the prior year’s ratio (calculated 
as (Ratiot – Ratiot-1)/Ratiot-1). All these increases are statistically significant. I obtained 
similar results using alternate deflators of assets and market value. I also estimated 
changes in the year before and the year after the SOP 97-2 implementation and found 
that they are not significant. Therefore, I conclude that the increases in the deferred-
revenue accounts in the implementation year do not reflect a time trend. 
Systems integrators (e.g., IBM) are more likely to defer additional revenues upon 
SOP 97-2 implementation than the prepackaged software firms (e.g., Microsoft). 
Systems integrators provide multiple additional services, such as customization, 
integration, training, and maintenance, along with their base software. Their base 
software typically doesn’t function without customization and integration services. 
Therefore, they face a greater difficulty in meeting the delivery condition in the early 
phases of a project. Moreover, because they customize their software to buyers’ 
specifications, they lack a history of substantially similar prior transactions. 
Accordingly, they face a greater difficulty in establishing VSOE.  
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Table 3 Panel B shows that implementing SOP 97-2 rules increased deferred-
revenue to revenue ratios of both prepackaged software firms and systems integrators. 
For prepackaged software firms, this ratio increased by 2.1% from the earlier level of 
12.1%. This change, on average, represents a 36% increase over the pre-implementation 
year ratio. For systems integrators, this ratio increased by 3.0% from the earlier level of 
7.0%. This change, on average, represents a 61% increase over the pre-implementation 
year ratio. This percent increase for the systems integrators exceeds the percent increase 
for the pre-packaged software firms, which suggests that the greater the difficulty in 
estimating the earnings completion process, the greater the increase in deferred-revenue 
accounts upon SOP 97-2 implementation. 
Discussion - univariate tests on deferred-revenue accounts 
The magnitude of increase in deferred-revenue accounts is not as dramatic as 
some respondents expected. The average increase in deferred-revenue accounts amounts 
to 2.3% of revenues. This magnitude does not support some respondents’ expectation of 
large revenue deferrals (e.g., read PWC’s and Lucent’s comments in Appendix B). One 
possible reason for this less consequential effect could be that instead of deferring entire 
revenues, firms started using construction accounting rules (SOP 81-1 [AICPA 1981]) 
more often. These rules allow firms to recognize revenues ratably proportional to 
passage of time or to provision of ancillary services. For example, Apple Inc. uses this 
method to reconize its iPhone sales revenues ratably over the service period. Therefore, 
the difference between the pre-SOP 97-2 method and the post-SOP 97-2 method could 
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reflect: (i) the difference between SOP 91-1 and SOP 97-2 rules; and (ii) a greater use of 
construction accounting. 
Nonetheless, recognizing revenues ratably based on construction accounting does 
not reflect the discrete value-delivery attribute of the software industry. For example, a 
software firm does not continually deliver its base software, which is typically the most 
valuable item in its multiple-element contract. It is fully uploaded all at once. Similarly, 
Apple Inc. delivers its iPhone in one discrete transaction. This discrete value-delivery 
attribute also manifests in the software industry’s milestone-based billing practices. 
Consequently, a mismatch between timeliness of value-delivery events and revenue-
recognition might adversely affect multiple-element firms’ earnings informativenes. 
Testing Hypothesis H1  
To investigate SOP 97-2’s effects on earnings informativeness, I examined 
changes in the earnings response coefficient (ERC) and the revenue response coefficient 
(RRC) in the prescribed implementation year relative to those in the prior year (Kothari 
2001, Altamuro et al. 2005, Zhang 2005). I regressed excess buy-and-hold returns over 
fiscal year (measured by percent change in end-of-the-year stock prices [DATA199] 
minus risk-free return [CRSP RF]) on changes in revenues (DATA 12) and net incomes 
(DATA 172). I deflated the latter two variables by beginning assets (DATA 6). I 
controlled for firm size (log of assets), Fama-French factors (i.e., excess market return 
[CRSP VWRETD − CRSP RF], high minus low growth [CRSP HML], small minus big 
size [CRSP SMB], and momentum [CRSP UMD]), and sub-industry and year fixed 
effects. I used the following regression: 
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 Excess_BHRit = β01 + β02 × After  
+ β11 × ∆NetIncomeit  +  β12 × After × ∆NetIncomeit  
+ β21 × ∆Revenueit  +  β22 × After × ∆Revenueit 
+ Σ βs1 × Controlsit  + Σ βs2 × After × Controlsit  + εit    
 (1) 
where 
∆ = one-year change; 
After = dummy variables set to 1 for observations in the prescribed 
implementation year, and 0 for the year prior to that year; 
i = 1 to 408 firms; and 
t = the prescribed implementation year and the year prior to that year.  
A negative β12 and β22 would indicate that ERC and RRC, respectively, decline 
due to implementation of SOP 97-2 rules.   
Results for hypothesis H1 
Table 4 Panel A (equation 1) shows that β12 is significantly negative. This 
indicates that ERC declined when firms implemented the SOP 97-2 rules. Furthermore, 
the summation of fixed effect and the interaction effects (β02 + β12) of implementing SOP 
97-2 is significantly negative. This result suggests that implementing SOP 97-2 rules 
deteriorates earnings informativeness in the software industry. However, β22 is not 
significantly negative. 
These results are consistent with Altamuro et al. (2006) and are contrary to the 
notion that implementing SAB 101 guidelines (i.e., the SOP 97-2 rules) deteriorates 
earnings informativeness because they have been misapplied in a set of non-intended 
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industries. On the contrary, these results support Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Fields, 
Lys, and Vincent (2001). Note the significantly positive coefficient on revenues despite 
controlling for net income. This indicates that for growth firms, revenues provide 
incremental value-relevant information beyond the information provided by earnings.   
Testing Hypothesis H2  
To test H2, I examined whether the market prices SOP 97-2-created deferred 
revenues more similarly to how it prices the revenues than to how it prices normal 
deferred revenues. I regressed excess buy-and-hold returns for the SOP 97-2 
implementation year on SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues and changes in normal 
deferred revenues and reported revenues. I controlled for changes in net incomes and 
deflated all dollar-denominated variables by beginning assets. I also controlled for firm 
size (log of assets) and firm age, which I estimated using incorporation-year data 
obtained from the firms’ 10K filings. In addition, I controlled for Fama-French factors, 
and sub-industry fixed effects and year fixed effects.   I used the following regression: 
Excess_BHRit = β0 + β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenuet  
+ β2 × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit  
+ β3 × ∆Revenueit + β4 × ∆NetIncomeit  
+ Σ βs × Controlsit + εit           (2) 
where 
∆ = one-year change; 
i = 1 to 251 firms; and 
t = the SOP 97-2 implementation year. 
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 A positive β2 that significantly differs from β1 but not from β3 might indicate that 
the market considers SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues as revenues and not as current 
liability.  
 Upon implementing SOP 97-2, the subsequent year’s earnings would include the 
effects of the implementation year’s SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues. However, 
based on the pre-SOP 97-2 method, these revenues would not be deferred and the 
subsequent year’s earnings would not include the effects of these deferrals. If the market 
considers SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues as revenues, the market would price the 
subsequent years’ earnings as if these earnings did not include the effects of SOP 97-2-
created deferrals. In other words, the market would price subsequent year’s earnings as if 
by subtracting the portion of earnings that resulted from late recognition of the SOP 97-
2-created deferred revenues. I examined this notion using the following test. 
 Let t represent the implementation year and let t+1 represent the subsequent year. 
Typically, returns in year t+1 should be associated with changes in earnings as follows: 
1
*
12011 +++ +∆×+= ititit ER εββ        (3) 
where, Rt+1 is the return, and ∆E*t+1  is the unobserved change in earnings, absent any 
SOP 97-2-created deferral. Based on the pre-SOP 97-2 method, ∆Et+1, which is 
observed, overstates ∆E*t+1 due to the implementation year’s SOP 97-2-created deferred 
revenues (SOPCDRt), as follows: 
ititit SOPCDRMarginEE ×+∆=∆ ++
*
11      (4) 
where margin represents net income to revenue ratio. Accordingly, the unobserved 
change in earnings, based on the pre-SOP 97-2 method, would be as follows: 
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ititit SOPCDRMarginEE ×−∆=∆ ++ 1
*
1      (5) 
Putting this in equation (3) gives: 
112011 )( +++ +×−∆×+= itititit SOPCDRMarginER εββ    (6) 
1120211 +++ +∆×+×−= itititit ESOPCDRR εβββ     (7) 
Therefore, controlling for changes in reported earnings in year t+1, if the 
association between returns in year t+1 and SOPCDRt (i.e., β2 in equation 7) is negative, 
it would indicate that the market prices the subsequent years’ earnings as if by 
“adjusting” for the portion of earnings that result from late recognition of the SOPCDR. 
Accordingly, I tested H2 based on combined tests of equation (1) and equation (8) 
below: 
Excess_BHRit+1 = β0 + β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenuet  
+ β2 × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit  
+ β3 × ∆Revenueit+1 + β4 × ∆NetIncomeit+1 
+ Σ βs × Controlsit+1 + εit+1           (8) 
where 
∆ = one-year change; 
i = 1 to 251 firms;  
t = the SOP 97-2 implementation year; and  
t+1 = the year subsequent to the SOP 97-2 implementation year. 
Results for hypothesis H2 
The first column of Table 5 Panel A (equation 2) shows that the 
contemporaneous returns are not significantly associated with increases in deferred-
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revenue accounts. This could be because, on one hand, increases in deferred-revenue 
accounts signal future revenues; on the other, they represent increases in current 
liabilities. However, the results in the second column show that disaggregating the 
deferred-revenue account into SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues and normal deferred 
revenues results in a positive coefficient on SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues. 
Importantly, this coefficient significantly differs from the coefficient on normal deferred 
revenues, but not from the coefficient on reported revenues. This result suggests that the 
market considers SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues as revenues and not as normal 
deferred revenues.  
The first two columns of Table 5 Panel B (equation 8) show that the subsequent 
year’s returns are unrelated to the implementation year’s aggregate deferred revenues as 
well as to its components (normal deferred revenue and SOP 97-2-created deferred 
revenues). However, the third column shows that controlling for the subsequent year’s 
reported revenues and net income, the coefficient on implementation year’s SOP 97-2-
created deferred revenues becomes negative. This negative sign suggests that the market 
prices the subsequent-year earnings as if by subtracting the portion of earnings that 
results from prior year’s SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues. Therefore, both the 
implementation and the subsequent years’ results support the premise that the pre-SOP 
97-2 accounting method more strongly corresponds with market returns.  
I also regressed the market value at the end of the implementation year on 
disaggregated balance sheet items. I deflated all dollar-denominated variables by the 
number of outstanding shares. Untabulated results show that the coefficients on assets 
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and liabilities are predictably positive and negative, respectively. Moreover, the 
coefficient on normal deferred revenue is predictably negative and does not differ 
significantly from that on current liabilities. On the contrary, the coefficient on SOP 97-
2-created deferred revenues is positive and significantly differs from that on current 
liabilities. Therefore, I obtained similar results using the balance-sheet items as those 
obtained using the income-statement items.   
Testing Hypothesis H3  
To test H3, I examined whether a regression specification using proforma 
earnings more strongly corresponds with market returns than does the specification using 
reported earnings. I calculate proforma revenues and proforma earnings by adding back 
SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues. I used the following regression: 
Excess_BHRit = β0 + β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenuet 
+ β2 × ∆ProformaRevenueit  
+ β4 × ∆ProformaNetIncomeit  
+ Σ βs × Controlsit + εit       (9) 
where 
∆ = one-year change; 
∆ProformaRevenue = ∆Revenue + SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues; 
∆ProformaNetIncome = ∆NetIncome + SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues; 
i = 1 to 251 firms;  
t = the SOP 97-2 implementation year. 
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I used the same control factors as described in equation 2. I examined whether 
adjusted R-square of equation 9 exceeds that of equation 2. 
Results for hypothesis H3 
The third column of Table 5 Panel A shows that using proforma accounting 
numbers results in a better specified model. Vuong test shows that the adjusted R-square 
of specification using the proforma numbers exceeds that of specification using the 
reported numbers. This suggests that if SOP 97-2 had not been implemented, the 
accounting numbers would more strongly correspond with market returns than do the 
reported numbers. 
The results of the three hypotheses, using three different research designs, 
suggest that the numbers calculated using pre-SOP 97-2 revenue-recognition rules more 
strongly correspond with market returns than do those using SOP 97-2.12 Therefore, my 
study complements Altamuro et al. (2005) by documenting that implementing SOP 97-2 
reduces earnings informativeness in the software industry, the industry for which these 
rules were originally created. More importantly, my results suggest that implementing 
the current revenue-recognition standard reduces earnings informativeness of multiple-
element firms.  
Supplementary Question 1: Naïve Reaction 
 Did implementing SOP 97-2 cause any adverse capital market consequences? 
Some market participants feared that reporting lower earnings (upon implementing SOP 
                                                 
12Alternatively, these results could indicate that investors prefer to compare financial statements, which are 
prepared using the same accounting rules (Sunder 1973). This explanation however, is less likely because 
I measure returns before earnings are announced. 
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97-2) could adversely affect firms’ financial position and fund-raising abilities.13  
Effectively, they feared that prices might not accurately reflect the mechanical earnings-
decreasing effects of SOP 97-2 -created deferrals. Prior studies (e.g., Lev and Ohlson 
1982, Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) concluded that the naïve reaction or functional fixation 
hypothesis cannot be entirely dismissed. 
 The difference between reported earnings and earnings based on the pre-SOP 97-
2 method would arise primarily because of SOP 97-2-created deferrals. The above 
market participants’ concerns would be valid if the market prices earnings as they are 
reported and correspondingly, prices SOP 97-2-created deferrals as current liabilities. 
However, my results suggest that the market prices the SOP 97-2-created deferrals as 
revenues and not as current liabilities. Therefore, I do not find statistical support for the 
notion that reporting lower earnings upon implementing SOP 97-2 leads to adverse 
capital market consequences. 
Supplementary Question 2: Aggressive Revenue-Recognition Before SOP 97-2 Was 
Enacted 
Were the software firms systematically recognizing revenues prematurely before 
AICPA enacted SOP 97-2? AICPA formulated stringent revenue-recognition rules based 
on this premise (Carmichael 1998). Accordingly, implementing SOP 97-2 rules would 
“correct” those software firms’ revenue-recognition timeliness that had been recognizing 
revenues prematurely. Such “correction” would result in additional revenue deferrals; 
                                                 
13
 For example, Haushahn Systems in its response letter states, “…would have a substantial negative 
impact on our financial position.” Ascential Software Corp. states in its 1998 10-K filing, “…will have a 
material adverse affect on the Company's revenues, gross margins and operating results. As a result, future 
capital raising efforts may also be adversely affected.” 
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the higher the correction, the greater the additional revenue deferrals. In other words, 
reporting increases in deferred-revenues accounts might signal firms’ prior aggressive 
revenue-recognition practices. Prior studies have documented that stock prices decline 
when firms reveal use of aggressive accounting practices.14  I would find support for this 
premise if (1) stock-prices decline when firms report increases in deferred-revenues 
accounts; or (2) the magnitude of these price-declines increases with rules-created 
deferrals.  
I calculated 7-day cumulative returns surrounding the days when firms reported 
the details on deferred-revenue accounts: the earnings announcement dates (Compustat 
RDQE of 4th quarter) and the 10-K filing dates (hand collected). Then, I used the 
following regression:  
7-dayReturnit = β01 + β02× DummyIncreaset  
+ β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenueit  
+ β21 × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit  
+ β22 × DummyIncreaset × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit  
+ β3 × ∆Revenueit + β4 × ∆NetIncomeit  
+ β5 × 7-dayMarketReturnt + Σ βs× Controlsit + εit    (10) 
Where 
∆ = one-year change; 
DummyIncrease = dummy variables set to 1 for observations with positive SOP 
97-2-created deferred revenues, and 0 otherwise; 
                                                 
14
 For example, when firms announce: (1) SEC’s AAER investigations (Feroz, Park, and Pastena 1991); 
and (2) accounting restatements (Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004). 
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i = 1 to 212 firms; and 
t = the SOP 97-2 implementation year  
I controlled for market returns, size, age, and firm and sub-industry fixed-
effects.15 A negative β02 or β22 would support AICPA’s premise. A negative β02 might 
indicate that prices decline when firms reveal increases in deferred-revenue accounts. 
And a negative β22 might indicate that these price-declines increase with magnitude of 
increases in deferred-revenue accounts. 
The results, presented in Table 6, show that neither β02 nor β22 is significantly 
negative. Therefore, I do not find statistical support for the premise that firms 
systematically recognized revenues prematurely before AICPA enacted SOP 97-2.  
Supplementary Question 3: Firm Disclosures   
 How did investors obtain information to distinguish SOP 97-2-created deferred 
revenues from normal deferred revenues? I examined one possible source of investor 
information – firms’ narrative disclosures in their 10-K filings. SEC rules require firms 
to discuss the effects of implementing a new accounting rule, such as SOP 97-2, both 
before and after its implementation: (1) before its implementation, SAB 74 (SEC 1987) 
requires firms to discuss the likely changes; and (2) after its implementation, MD&A 
rules (SEC 1989) require firms to discuss the material changes in line-items, especially if 
these changes relate to revenue items.  Moreover, academic research predicts that firms 
will increase their narrative disclosures when accounting rules reduce firms’ accounting 
discretion (Dye 1985, Kasznik 1996).  
                                                 
15
 Ideally, I should use analysts’ forecasts to estimate revenue and earnings surprises. However, I could not 
find analysts’ forecasts in the IBES database for most of my sample firms. 
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Table 7 Panel A presents a sample of the before disclosures. In their 10-K filings, 
most firms described that they planned to implement SOP 97-2 in their next fiscal year. 
However, they did not provide many details about forthcoming accounting changes. 
Most firms stated that they did not expect significant changes from implementing the 
SOP 97-2 rules.  Table 7 Panel B presents a sample of the after disclosures. Similar to 
the before disclosures, most firms did not provide many details on SOP 97-2 effects.  
Firms typically stated: “No material effect to the company’s operation or financial 
position taken as a whole,” (e.g., Nyfix Inc.). Very few firms quantified the effects of 
implementing SOP 97-2 rules. Therefore, I conjecture that the market relied on non-
financial sources to distinguish between the two deferred-revenue components.  How the 
market prices these two components differently remains a topic for future research.  
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V.   CONCLUSIONS 
 Revenue is among the largest and most value-relevant items in firms’ financial 
statements. However, it is not easy to determine revenues for firms that use the 
“customer-centric” and “relationship marketing” approach (i.e., those firms that bundle 
multiple products and services and deliver them over extended periods). As more and 
more firms adopt a relationship-marketing approach, the complexity of revenue-
recognition issues increases.  
 The dilemma for standard setters remains: What is the optimum level of 
objectivity and verifiability requirements that would enhance the two important 
“qualitative characteristics” of financial statements: relevance and reliability (FASB 
2005)? Standard setters’ rules-making processes often involve trade-offs between these 
two characteristics. On the one hand, if standard setters make rules too conservative, by 
requiring firms to comply with highly objective and verifiable conditions, revenues may 
not reflect economic performance in a timely manner (affects relevance). On the other 
hand, if standard setters make the rules too lax, firms can use this freedom to recognize 
revenues prematurely (affects reliability).  
 Standard setters would have faced a similar dilemma when they formulated SOP 
97-2. In response to software firms’ perceived premature revenue-recognition practices, 
AICPA increased objectivity and verifiability requirements before firms could recognize 
revenues from multiple-element contracts. However, estimating whether a multiple-
element firm has “earned” revenues routinely involves subjective estimates. For 
example: 1) in allocating aggregate contract value to various elements that are not sold 
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separately and 2) in deciding whether an element provides functional value pending 
delivery of another element. Nevertheless, SOP 97-2 requires a firm to defer recognizing 
entire revenues when it cannot objectively and verifiably determine the extent of earned 
revenues from a multiple-element contract.  
 I find that implementing SOP 97-2 increases revenue deferrals and reduces 
software firms’ earnings informativeness. In other words, imposing highly objective and 
verifiable conditions before firms can recognize revenues from multiple-element 
contracts leads to deferral of revenues, which managers would have otherwise 
recognized using subjective estimates. My finding suggests that recognizing such 
deferred amounts in a timely manner conveys more useful information to financial 
statement users. 
 My findings should be useful to FASB in its current deliberations (FASB/IASB 
2007). FASB is evaluating alternative revenue-recognition approaches, which include: 
(1) the measurement model (i.e., the fair-value approach) and (2) the allocation model 
(i.e., the customer-consideration approach). The latter model is constructively similar to 
the earnings-completion model. My study suggests that imposing highly objective 
conditions for multiple-element revenue recognition could lead to economic effects 
similar to those from SOP 97-2 implementation.  
 Admittedly, I have examined only one criterion – how accounting numbers 
correspond with securities prices – among several that guide the standard setters’ 
decisions. Holthausen and Watts (2001) conclude that evaluating accounting rules using 
only the relevance criterion does not adequately describe the rules-setting process. 
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Nevertheless, Barth et al. (2001) argue that share prices reflect accounting numbers, only 
if the relevant information is measured and reflected reliably in the accounting numbers. 
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APPENDIX A 
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN REVENUE-RECOGNITION PRACTICES UPON IMPLEMENTING SOP 91-1, 
SOP 97-2 AND SAB 101* 
Panel A:  SOP 91-1 implementation in the software industry  
Revenue recognition criteria  
Before After Significant changes in industry practices  
A 1983, survey results showed 
a substantial diversity in 
revenue recognition practices 
ranging from the very 
conservative (on customer 
payment) to the decidedly 
aggressive (immediately on 
contract signing). 15% of the 
companies used contract 
signing-date to recognize 
entire revenues.  
1. Delivered or 
performed  
• License with no vendor obligations:  Recognize revenue upon delivery of the 
software. 
• License with insignificant vendor obligations: Accrue costs of insignificant 
obligations or defer a pro-rata portion of revenue and recognize it ratably as 
the costs are incurred. 
• License with significant vendor obligations: Recognize revenue according to 
the contract accounting method or as a service transaction 
• Post-contract support: Recognize revenue over the period during which the 
services are provided. 
 
2. Realizable 
 
Panel B:  SOP 97-2 implementation in the software industry 
Revenue recognition criteria  
Before After Significant changes in industry practices  
1. Delivered or performed 1. Evidence of 
arrangement 
2. Delivered or 
performed 
(expanded 
definition) 
• Element-by-element revenue recognition 
• If functionality of a delivered element requires delivery of another element, 
then revenues for that element should be deferred. Otherwise, firm should 
recognize entire revenues ratably (SOP 81-1).  
• If the contract promises a “when-and-if available” element, such as an 
unspecified upgrade, such an element creates a contingency that should be 
accounted as a separate element. 
2. Realizable 
 
3. Realizable 
4. Determinable 
fees 
• Firm should objectively and verifiably determine fair values of all elements 
based on its own prior transactions. Otherwise it should defer revenues in its 
entirety or recognize them ratably (SOP 81-1). 
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Panel C:  SAB 101/SAB 104 implementation in the non-software industries  
Revenue-recognition criteria  
Before After Significant changes in industry practices ‡ 
Several industry-
specific and general 
standards  
1. Evidence of 
arrangement 
2. Delivered or 
performed†  
3. Realizable 
4. Determinable fees† 
 
†Multiple-element 
conditions later clarified 
through SAB 104 (SEC 
2000) and EITF00-21 
(FASB 2002)  
• Licensing arrangements: Delivery and revenue recognition don't occur until 
the term of the license begins. 
• Layaway programs: Sellers should not record revenue until the product is 
delivered to the customer. 
• Upfront fees: Even if nonrefundable, these fees should be deferred and 
recognized over the term of the agreement. 
• Setup services: Should be recognized on a straight-line basis over the term of 
the contract, even if most of the costs are incurred up front. 
• Contingent rent: Income contingent on a factor other than time should be 
recorded only when the contingency is resolved. 
• Rental income: Retailers can recognize only the rental income from leased or 
licensed departments, not that department's revenues. 
‡92% of firms that changed their revenue-recognition practices did it to comply 
with the new delivery condition. 
*References: Lowell (1994), Carmichael (1998), Osterland (2000), and Moffeit and Eikner (2003). 
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APPENDIX B 
REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS RECEIVED BY AICPA ON THE DRAFT SOP 97-2*  
 
Respondent/Issue  Quote from the comment letters  
Firm should defer recognizing revenues corresponding to a delivered element if it cannot establish that element’s VSOE   
Pricewaterhouse  We are troubled that in some multiple element arrangements the ED’s requirements for VSOE of fair value 
will lead to deferral of all revenue, even in situations where software products having clear value and 
immediate utility to customer have been delivered. At first blush, this seems unduly harsh. 
 
BriarCliff College  Deferring revenue recognition for all other elements in a multiple element arrangement because one element in 
bundle could not be fairly valued seems too conservative. This is like stopping all traffic on freeway because 
one car is broken down. 
 
Lucent Corp  We are troubled by the underlying assumption that all software companies can and do market all of their 
products separately. There are some software companies which actively bundle their products and 
services…..these companies may not be able to comply with VSOE evidence criteria. 
 
Candle Corporation  Due to many pricing considerations and variables described above, the permutations and competitive pricing 
makes it impractical to meet VSOE requirements 
 
Massachusetts Society of CPAs  We believe that the concept of VSOE may in fact be quite difficult for software companies to actually apply in 
their business….An “all or nothing” approach can significantly swing revenues….. 
 
    
Firm cannot recognize revenue corresponding to a delivered element until it delivers all elements essential for the functioning of that element  
Lucent Technologies  All of the criteria to recognize revenue may be met for the most significant elements, yet all of the revenue 
would have to be deferred solely because… products sold in bundled package. E.g. services compose between 
1% and 15% of total revenue… the company would be forced to defer 100% of revenue until 100% of services 
were performed…. 
 
Pricewaterhouse  If for example, the vendor never sells training services on a discrete basis, the ED would seem to require 
deferral of all revenue from the arrangement until the delivery of ancillary training services are completed. In 
many circumstances, we do not believe such accounting would be appropriate. 
 
    
Firm should allocate and defer recognizing revenues corresponding to specified upgrades. If the firm cannot determine the amount to allocate, it 
should defer entire revenues from the contract 
 
Hausahn Systems and Engineers  …Since we do not charge for upgrades, it is unclear whether we would have to allocate…  
Arthur Anderson  SOP should be expanded with a discussion of how to determine VSOE of fair value of an upgrade right  
Lucent Technologies  … We believe that it would be inappropriate to defer the entire amount of software revenue as a result of 
specifies upgrade/enhancement that is not of significance to the transaction. 
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Respondent/Issue  Quote from the comment letters  
Firm should defer revenues for the entire amount at risk due to acceptance/warranty/performance clause/right of return:  
Arthur Anderson  We believe that routine acceptance clauses should not preclude revenue recognition at delivery. 
I2 Technologies   In large enterprise software offerings where customer is spending million of dollars for mission 
critical software, the customer often rightfully requires a warranty for a year or more. ….I believe 
this should not impair revenue recognition 
 
Implementing SOP 97-2 rules might lead to violation of  matching principle 
 
Lucent Technologies  Bulk of costs will already have been expensed…while revenue will not be recognized until all 
elements are delivered….this could be a departure from matching principle and could be very 
misleading 
 
Hausahn Systems and Engineers  In our case, approximately 90% of baseline development costs are expensed as period cost. Deferral 
of revenue will probably result in a lack of matching revenue and expense. 
 
    
Firm should recognize license revenues ratably over the service period if it cannot establish VSOE for the license  
Inso Corp  If sufficient VSOE does not exist to allocate the license fee to the separate elements, the entire 
arrangement fee should be recognized ratably over the period during which PCS is expected to be 
provided.  
 
California Society of CPAs  To impose the “separate” pricing criteria is not realistic and will generally preclude revenue 
recognition on initial delivery ….. 
 
    
Firms might find it difficult to establish VSOE based primarily on prior transactions  
California Society of CPAs  We are concerned with the ability to estimate the extent to which that price protection will be 
required ….given that much of the software industry is known for its short product cycles and 
intense competition. 
 
Inso Corporation  We believe the concept of VSOE may be difficult for software companies to apply in 
practice….concept of fair value is the value a willing buyer will spend. 
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Respondent/Issue  Quote from the comment letters  
Firm should defer revenues for collections beyond a 12-month period 
Arthur Anderson  It is unclear…. 
1. revenues should be recognized on cash basis. 
2. beyond 12 months be recognized in the (later) period when they become due and  within 12 
months recognized at delivery 
3. In the period they become due within 12 months 
Cash basis is inconsistent with other areas of revenue recognition (e.g. real estate ... when entire 
revenue is recognized on down payment) 
J. D. Edwards  Revenue would be understated if all of the vendor obligations have been met and only negotiated 
payment terms remain. 
 
 
Firm should defer revenues for the entire amount of  coupons issued instead of accruing only the costs of expected redemption  
 
Mysoftware Company  We would have to defer 100% of the revenues of the free products in redemption and coupon 
implementations… We have been accruing the redemption costs rather than defer revenues. 
 
Software Publishers Association  The accounting used for coupons in the retail/grocery industry should be considered whereby the 
seller recognizes revenue and estimated costs of providing the additional software products are 
accrued. 
 
*I obtained copies of comment letters from the AICPA library. 
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APPENDIX C 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
 
Assets = Compustat DATA6 
Revenue = Compustat DATA12 
Net income = Compustat DATA172 
Market value = Common shares outstanding (Compustat DATA25) × fiscal year 
end closing price (Compustat DATA199). 
Age (in years) = Fiscal year – year of incorporation. I obtained incorporation date 
from the 10-K filings.  
Implementation year = Fiscal year in which firm starts applying the SOP 97-2 revenue-
recognition rules. I obtained this information from firm’s 10-K 
filings by studying the “revenue recognition” section in the 
“significant accounting policies” footnote. 
Prescribed implementation year  = Firms’ fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. For firms 
with fiscal year ending June to November, the prescribed year was 
fiscal year (Compustat YEARA) 1999. For all other firms, the 
prescribed year was fiscal year 1998. 
After = Dummy variables set to 1 for observations in the prescribed 
implementation year, and 0 for the year prior to that year. 
Return on assets = Net income (Compustat DATA172) / Total assets (DATA6). 
Return on equity = [Share price (Compustat DATA199) – Lag(Share 
price)]/Lag(share price). 
Revenue to assets ratio = Revenue (Compustat DATA12) / Total Assets (DATA6). 
Deferred Revenue = Deferred revenue account. I obtained information on this account 
from the liabilities section and the footnotes in firms’ 10-K filings. 
I searched for terms including: “deferred revenue,” “unearned 
income,” and “billings in excess of revenue”. 
Normal deferred revenue ratio = The average of Deferred Revenue/ Revenue ratio for the two years 
prior to the implementation year. 
Normal deferred revenue = Normal deferred revenue ratio × Revenue. This represents the 
deferred revenue account had SOP 97-2 not been implemented.  
SOP 97-2-created deferred revenue = Reported deferred revenue – normal deferred revenue. This 
represents changes in deferred-revenue accounts that result from 
SOP 97-2 implementation. 
DummyIncrease = Dummy variables set to 1 for observations with positive SOP 97-
2-created deferred revenues; and 0 otherwise. 
Proforma Revenue = Revenue + SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues. Represents 
revenues had SOP 97-2 not been implemented. 
Proforma Net Income = Net Income + SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues. Represents net 
income had SOP 97-2 not been implemented. 
Excess_BHR = Excess buy and hold return [Return on equity – returns for the 
risk-free securities (CRSP RF)] over the fiscal year. 
Excess market return = [Cumulated monthly returns for value-weighted index (CRSP 
VWRETD) – those for the risk-free securities (CRSP RF)] over 
the fiscal year. 
High minus low = [Cumulated monthly returns for the high-growth portfolios – those 
for the low-growth portfolios (CRSP HML)] over the fiscal year. 
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Small minus big = [Cumulated monthly returns for the small-cap portfolios – those 
for the big-cap portfolios (CRSP SMB)] over the fiscal year. 
Momentum = [Cumulated monthly returns for the high-prior-returns portfolio 
– those for the low-prior-returns portfolios (CRSP UMD)] over 
the fiscal year. 
7-Day_MAR  = Cumulated daily returns over the 7-trading-days period (–3 to 
+3) surrounding the event days (CRSP RET) – the market 
return for the same period (CRSP VWRETD). 
Earnings announcement date = Compustat RDQE for fourth quarter (Compustat QTR) of the 
fiscal year.  
10-K filing date = Dates stamped on 10-K filings, obtained from SEC EDGAR 
database. 
All regression variables are winsorized at 5% and 95% levels, on a replacement basis. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample derivation and distribution 
 
Panel A:  Sample selection  
 
Distinct firms 
H1 
  Distinct 
firms 
H2 and H3 
First Stage (Compustat)   
Firms in compustat with 4-digit SIC code = 7372 or 7373 and 
data available for any fiscal years 1996-2000 
1,007 1007 
Less: Firms that do not have continuous data for revenue, 
assets, and closing price for each of the three years ending in 
the prescribed implementation year −599  
Final sample (H1) 408  
Less: Firms that do not have revenue and assets data for each 
of the fiscal years 1996-2000  −584 
Base sample for hand collection (H2 and H3)  423 
   
 
Second Stage (Hand-collected from10-K filings)  
  
−20 Less: Firms not in software industry (e.g. a holding company)  
Less: Foreign filers   −37 
Less: Firms with no data on deferred revenue  −55 
Less: Firms with GVKEYs above 66,500 that have no 
electronic 10-K filings in early years of the sample period  −25 
Filtered sample (H2 and H3)  286 
   
Third stage (Implementation year can be determined)    
Filtered sample  286 
Firms for which implementation year could not be determined  −35 
Final Sample (H2 and H3)  251 
 
Supplementary test 2 (CRSP data is available)   
Filtered sample  251 
Firms for which CRSP data is not available  −39 
Final Sample (Supplementary test 2)  212 
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 
Panel B:  Distribution of sample firms 
Break-down of final sample 
 Distinct firms 
H1 
 Percent of 
sample 
 Distinct firms 
H2 and H3 
 Percent of 
sample 
Prepackaged software firms 
(SIC code 7372) 
 
302 
 
74% 187 75% 
Integrated systems design 
firms (SIC code 7373) 
 
106 
 
26% 64 25% 
Total firm-years  408  100% 251 100% 
 
 
Panel C:  Distribution by implementation fiscal-years (H2 and H3 sample) 
 
 Distinct firms 
H2 and H3 
 Percent of 
sample 
 
Firms that adopted SOP 97-2 in the prescribed year  219  87% 
Firms that adopted early  4  2% 
Firms that adopted late  28  11% 
Total firm-years  251  100% 
 
Panel D:  Distribution by implementation fiscal-years (corresponding to Compustat YEARA) 
Implementation year 
(Prescribed: for H1) 
(Actual: for H2 and H3) 
 
Distinct firms 
H1 
 
Percent of 
sample 
 
Distinct firms 
H2 and H3  
 
Percent of 
sample 
1997       4  2% 
1998  303  74% 181  72% 
1999  105  26% 59  23% 
2000       7  3% 
Total firm-years  408  100% 251  100% 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics for sample firms in the prescribed implementation year (H1:408 
firms) 
 Mean  
Standard 
deviation  
First 
quartile  Median  
Third 
quartile 
Firm demographics  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Assets in $M 500  3,427  11  37  145 
Revenue in $M 461  3,087  12  36  139 
Market value in $M 2,272  25,037  17  55  316 
Net income in $M 43  460  -5  0  6 
Net income as % of lag 
assets 
-26% 
 
155% 
 
-25% 
 
-2% 
 
11% 
Return on equity in % 27%  153%  -47%  -9%  48% 
Revenue growth in % 38%  209%  -8%  14%  41% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Descriptive statistics for sample firms in the actual implementation year (H2 and H3:251 
firms) 
 Mean  
Standard 
deviation  
First 
quartile  Median  
Third 
quartile 
Firm demographics  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Assets in $M 337  1,634  16  50  161 
Revenue in $M 276  1,185  17  47  138 
Market value in $M 1,966  17,281  23  85  409 
Net income in $M 32  301  (7)  0  7 
Deferred Revenue in $M 37  222  1  5  15 
Age in years 12  9  6  11  16 
Net income as % of lag assets -11%  40%  -23%  0%  12% 
Return on equity in % 35%  145%  -44%  -3%  55% 
Revenue growth in % 46%  195%  -6%  18%  46% 
SOP 97-2-created deferred 
revenue as % of lag assets 1.66%  7.78%  -2.41%  0.84%  5.13% 
Percent change in deferred 
revenue to revenue ratio over 
the prior years’ level 
42.1%  84.2%  -0.08%  12.2%  60.3% 
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TABLE 3 
Change in deferred-revenue account upon SOP 97-2 implementation 
 
Panel A: Changes in deferred-revenue account in the following four years: The two years before the implementation year, the implementation 
year, and the year after the implementation year 
 Mean 
25 
Percentile Median 
75 
 Percentile 
Difference Comparing individual instances 
Means Median Change 
is 
positive 
No 
change 
Change 
is 
negative 
t-test* Wilcoxon* 
(p-value) (p-value) 
Deferred-revenue as a percent of assets   
  
   
Two years before the implementation year 10.0% 2.6% 7.7% 14.5%      0.4% 0.9% 47% 0% 53% 
One year before the implementation year 10.4% 3.7% 8.6% 14.5% (0.35) (0.21) 2.1% 2.2% 66% 0% 34% 
The implementation year 12.5% 5.1% 10.8% 17.0% (0.01) (0.01) 
-0.7% -1.6% 48% 0% 52% 
The year after the implementation year 11.8% 4.7% 9.2% 17.4% (0.45) (0.18) 
     
   
  
   
Deferred-revenue as a percent  of revenue   
  
   
Two years before the implementation year 10.4% 2.9% 7.9% 15.0%      0.5% 1.7% 46% 0% 54% 
One year before the implementation year 10.9% 3.7% 9.6% 15.3% (0.30) (0.19) 2.3% 2.1% 67% 0% 33% 
The implementation year 13.2% 6.0% 11.7% 18.4% (0.01) (0.01) 
-0.2% -0.2% 49% 0% 51% 
The year after the implementation year 13.0% 5.6% 11.5% 18.5% (0.85) (0.39) 
     
* One-tailed tests  
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 
Panel A continued 
 Mean 
25 
Percentile Median 
75 
 Percentile 
Difference Comparing individual instances 
Means Median Change 
is 
positive 
No 
change 
Change 
is 
negative 
t-test* Wilcoxon* 
(p-value) (p-value) 
Deferred-revenue as a percent of market value   
  
   
Two years before the implementation year 5.2% 0.9% 2.7% 6.6%      0.8% 1.6% 53% 0% 47% 
One year before the implementation year 6.0% 1.4% 3.3% 8.8% (0.12) (0.06) 3.4% 2.2% 65% 1% 34% 
The implementation year 9.4% 1.8% 5.5% 11.6% (0.01) (0.01) 
-2.9% -2.5% 33% 2% 65% 
The year after the implementation year 6.9% 1.1% 3.0% 8.8% (0.01) (0.01) 
     
* One-tailed tests  
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
 
Panel B: Changes in deferred revenue by industry sub-classification 
 Mean 
25 
Percentile Median 
75 
 Percentile 
Difference Comparing individual instances 
Means Median Change 
is 
positive 
No 
change 
Change 
is 
negative 
t-test* Wilcoxon* 
(p-value) (p-value) 
Deferred-revenue as percent of revenue for prepackaged software firms (SIC code 7372), which assume less complex multiple-element obligations 
Two years before the implementation year 11.5% 4.3% 10.3% 15.8%      0.6% 0.5%  
48% 
 
0% 
 
52% One year before the implementation year  12.1% 
 
4.9% 
 
10.8% 
 
17.6% 
(0.36) (0.23) 
2.1% 2.2%  
65% 
 
0% 
 
35% The implementation year  14.2% 
 
7.3% 
 
13.0% 
 
18.6% 
(0.01) (0.01) 
-0.1% -0.2%  
49% 
 
0% 
 
51% The year after the implementation year  14.1% 
 
7.2% 
 
12.8% 
 
19.1% 
(0.95) (0.94) 
     
Change in deferred revenue to revenue ratio (implementation year) as a percent of previous year’s ratio = 36.3% significant at p-level of 0.01 
   
  
   
Deferred-revenue as percent of revenue for integrated systems design firms(SIC code 7373), which assume more complex multiple-element obligations 
Two years before the implementation year  7.1% 
 
1.1% 
 
4.2% 
 
7.4% 
     
-0.1% -0.1%  
40% 
 
0% 
 
60% One year before the implementation year  7.0% 
 
1.5% 
 
4.1% 
 
9.9% 
(0.95) (0.69) 
3.0% 2.3%  
73% 
 
0% 
 
26% The implementation year  10.0% 
 
3.1% 
 
6.4% 
 
13.5% 
(0.02) (0.03) 
-0.3% -0.5%  
52% 
 
0% 
 
48% The year after the implementation year  9.7% 
 
2.3% 
 
5.9% 
 
14.4% 
(0.85) (0.63) 
     
Change in deferred revenue to revenue ratio (implementation year) as a percent of previous year’s ratio = 60.5% significant at p-level of 0.01 
 
Differential effect of SOP 97-2 on the two industry subgroups    
    
Change in deferred revenue to revenue ratio (implementation year) as a percent of previous year’s ratio = 24.2% significant at p-level of 0.03 
* One-tailed tests  
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TABLE 4 
Whether earnings informativeness declines upon SOP 97-2 implementation 
 
Panel A: Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) compared for the following two years: the 
year before the prescribed implementation year and the prescribed implementation year  
 
Excess_BHRit = β01 + β01 × After  
+ β11 × ∆NetIncomeit  +  β12 × After × ∆NetIncomeit  
+ β21 × ∆Revenueit  +  β22 × After × ∆Revenueit 
+ Σ βs1 × Controlsit  + Σ βs2 × After × Controlsit  + εit 
 
Variable Predicted sign  Estimate  p-value* 
Intercept 
   
0.638  0.222 
After (β02)   -1.019  0.219 
Change in net income +  0.446  0.001 
After × Change in net income (β12) −  -0.241  0.094 
Change in revenue +  0.504  0.001 
After × Change in revenue (β22) −  0.025  0.856 
Controls for Fama-French factors, Momentum, Size, and 
Year- and Sub-industry fixed effects    Yes 
Total number of observations (N)      816 
Number of distinct firms     408 
F-Value      8.35 
Probability   0.001 
Ftest*: β02 + β12 = 0 0.067 
Ftest*: β02 + β22 = 0 0.122 
All dollar denominated variables are deflated by beginning assets.  
* one-tailed tests for directional hypotheses  
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TABLE 5 
Whether the market considers the SOP 97-2-created deferred revenues as revenues or as current liability 
 
Panel A: The implementation year  
Excess_BHRit = β0 + β1 × ∆DeferredRevenueit + β2 × ∆Revenueit + β4 × ∆NetIncomeit + Σ βs × Controlsit + εit    (1) 
Excess_BHRit = β0 + β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenueit + β2 × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit + β3 × ∆Revenueit + β4 × ∆NetIncomeit  
  + Σ βs × Controlsit + εit            (2) 
Excess_BHRit = β0 + β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenueit +  β2 × ∆ProformaRevenueit + β4 × ∆ProformaNetIncomeit + Σ βs × Controlsit + εit (3) 
   
 
(1) 
Reported accounting 
numbers  
(2) 
Disaggregated deferred-
revenue account 
(3) 
Proforma accounting 
numbers 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign 
  
Estimate 
 
p-value* 
 
Estimate 
 
p-value* Estimate 
 
p-value* 
Intercept 
    
-0.368 
 
0.564 
 
-0.372 
 
0.555 -0.391 
 
0.532 
Change in deferred revenue +   0.155  0.378            
Change in normal deferred revenue  (β1) +/−         -0.776  0.155 -0.711  0.153 
SOP 97-2-created deferred revenue  (β2) +         1.138  0.074      
Change in revenue                             (β3) +   0.750  0.001  0.774  0.001      
Change in net income +   0.622  0.001  0.617  0.001      
Proforma-change in revenue +          0.754  0.001 
Proforma-change in net income +          0.606  0.001 
Controls for Fama-French factors, Momentum, Size, Age, and 
Year- and Sub-industry fixed effects  Yes 
 
  
 
Yes   
 
Yes 
Total number of observations (N)      251    251   251 
Adjusted R-squared      17.4%    21.0%   21.3% 
F-Value      4.92    5.58   6.03 
Probability    
 
 0.001    0.001   0.001 
Second Specification: 
    
Ftest*:  β1 = β2 0.006  
Ftest*:    β2 = β3 0.333  
First and Third Specifications: 
  
Vuong-test*:  R-square using reported numbers (1) = R-square using proforma numbers (3) 
 0.072 
All dollar denominated variables are deflated by beginning assets.  
* One-tailed tests for directional hypotheses
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TABLE 5 CONTINUED 
 
Panel B: The year after the implementation year  
 
Excess_BHRit+1 = β0 + β1 × ∆DeferredRevenueit +  β2 × ∆Revenueit+1 + β3 × ∆NetIncomeit+1 + Σ βs × Controlsit+1 + εit+1   (1) 
Excess_BHRit+1 = β0 + β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenueit + β2 × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit  + Σ βs × Controlsit+1 + εit+1  (2)  
Excess_BHRit+1 = β0 + β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenueit + β2 × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit + β3 × ∆Revenueit+1 + β4 × ∆NetIncomeit+1  
   
+ Σ βs × Controlsit+1 + εit+1           (3) 
   (1) 
 
 
Aggregated 
implementation year’s 
deferred-revenue 
account  
(2) 
 
 
 
Disaggregated 
implementation year’s 
deferred-revenue account  
(3) 
Disaggregated 
implementation year’s 
deferred-revenue 
account, controlling for 
subsequent year’s 
earnings 
Variable 
Predict
ed sign 
 
Estimate 
 
p-value* 
 
Estimate 
 
p-value* 
 
Estimate 
 
p-value* 
Intercept 
   
-0.693 
 
0.367 
 
0.071 
 
0.933 
 
-0.480 
 
0.536 
Change in deferred revenue(t) +/−  -0.514  0.470             
Change in normal deferred revenue(t) +/−        -0.488  0.573  -0.471  0.555 
SOP 97-2-created deferred revenue(t) −        -0.640  0.597  -1.939  0.043 
Change in revenue(t+1) +  0.292  0.033        0.305  0.028 
Change in net income(t+1) +  1.538  0.001        1.599  0.001 
Controls for Fama-French factors, Momentum, Size, Age, and 
Year- and Sub-industry fixed effects  
 
Yes 
 
  
 
Yes 
 
  
 
Yes 
Total number of observations (N)      251     251     251 
F-Value      9.81     5.82     9.26 
Probability      0.001     0.001     0.001 
All dollar denominated variables are deflated by beginning assets.  
* one-tailed tests for directional hypotheses 
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TABLE 6 
Whether the stock prices decline when firms report increases in deferred-revenue accounts upon SOP 97-2 implementation 
 
7-dayReturnit = β01 + β02× DummyIncreaset + β1 × ∆NormalDeferredRevenueit  
+ β21 × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit + β22 × DummyIncreaset × SOP97-2CreatedDeferredRevenueit  
+ β3 × ∆Revenueit + β4 × ∆NetIncomeit + β5 × 7-dayMarketReturnt + Σ βs× Controlsit + εit   
 
 
Predicte
d sign 
 7-trading days 
surrounding 10-K filing 
dates  
7-trading days 
surrounding earnings 
announcement dates  
Variable  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  
Intercept +/− 
 
-0.183  0.047 
 
0.123  0.144 
 
Dummy Increase (β02) −  0.026  0.337  0.021  0.418  
Change in normal deferred revenue +/−  -0.010  0.935  0.004  0.970  
Rules-created deferred revenue +/−  -0.512  0.136  0.205  0.512  
Dummy Increase × SOP97-2-created deferred revenue (β22) −  0.686  0.103  -0.190  0.624  
Change in revenue +  0.055  0.041  0.001  0.485  
Change in net income +  0.034  0.186  -0.038  0.137  
7-dayMarketReturn   1.704  0.001  0.613  0.030  
Controls for Size, Age, and Year- and Sub-industry fixed effects    Yes     Yes  
Total number of observations (N)     212    212  
Adjusted R-squared     9.8%    0. 9%  
F-Value     2.760    1.150  
Probability     0.001    0.322  
All firm-specific variables are deflated by beginning assets. 
  
59
 
TABLE 7 
Effects of SOP 97-2 – representative disclosures from firms’ 10-K filings, before and after SOP 97-2 implementation 
 
Panel A: Firms’ discussions on the expected effects of SOP 97-2 before implementation (SAB 74 compliance) 
Name of firm 
 Compustat 
fiscal year 
 
Quote from the 10K filings 
 
  
Most firms expected no significant effect (typical response, almost  90% of firms)  
Pegasystems Inc.  1997  Beginning in 1998, the Company will be required to adopt the provisions of SOP 97-2, "Software 
Revenue Recognition." The implementation of the statement is not estimated to have a significant 
impact on the Company. 
 
      
Some firms expressed uncertainty on new rules or their effects   
Citrix Systems Inc.   1997  ……. the impact on the future financial results of the Company is not currently determinable. 
 
 
HNC Software Inc.  1997  …. could lead to unanticipated changes in the Company's current revenue recognition practices, and 
such changes could be material to the Company's financial statements. 
 
      
Some firms expected significant deferral of revenues  
Ascential Software Corp  1997  The implementation may, in certain circumstances, result in the deferral of software license 
revenues that would have been recognized upon delivery of the related software under preceding 
accounting standards. 
 
Veritas Software Corp.  1997  The criteria for recognizing revenue under SOP 97-2 are generally more rigorous than the previous 
accounting standard and, in some cases, significantly more rigorous.  
 
Acme Comm Corp  1997  This standard is expected to result in more conservative revenue recognition on software 
transactions than was allowed under previous guidance. 
 
      
A few firms planned to change their contracts to align with SOP 97-2 rules  
Global Med 
Technologies Inc. 
 1997  Management's current plans to address the revenue recognition requirements of SOP 97-2 include 
substantial revisions to Wyndgate's current standard terms and conditions included as part of 
Wyndgate's SAFETRACE(R) software license agreements.   
 
 
A few firms expected that implementing SOP 97-2 rules would  adversely affect firm’s fund raising plans 
Ascential Software Corp.  1997  Failure to effectively address the revenue recognition requirements of SOP 97-2 and future revenue 
recognition guidance regarding the software industry will have a material adverse affect on the 
Company's revenues, gross margins and operating results.  As a result, future capital raising efforts 
may also be adversely affected. 
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TABLE 7 CONTINUED 
 
Panel B: Firm’s discussion on the effects of SOP 97-2 after implementation (MD&A rules compliance) 
Name of firm 
 Compustat 
fiscal year 
 
Quote from the 10K filings 
Most firms found no material effect (typical response, almost  90% of firms)  
Nyfix Inc.  1998  The Company adopted SOP 97-2 in 1998 and the effect was not material to the Company’s 
operations or financial position taken as a whole. 
 
      
Some firms mentioned that implementing SOP 97-2 rules led to deferral of revenues  
Electronic Arts Inc.  1998  The implementation  has, in certain  circumstances,  resulted  in the deferral of certain revenues  
associated  with the  Company's  revenue  promotions  and products with multiple deliverable 
elements 
 
Intrusion Inc.  1998  The most significant impact of SOP 97-2 on the Company's revenue recognition accounting policies 
is that for software contracts with multiple elements, revenue will generally be recognized later than 
under past practices under SOP 91-1. 
 
Intellisync Corp.  1999  The implementation has, in certain circumstances, resulted in the deferral of software license 
revenues that would have been recognized upon delivery of the related software under prior 
accounting standards. 
 
      
A few firms blamed SOP 97-2 for their poor performance  
Aspyra Inc.  1998  Although the Company has been profitable in each of its last six previous fiscal years, its 1998 fiscal 
year resulted in a loss primarily attributable to the implementation of a new accounting method, 
SOP 97-2 
 
Softech Inc.  1998  Due to stricter requirements for recognizing revenue from the sale of software products, 
implementation of the provisions of SOP 97-2 had the effect of reducing revenue in fiscal 1999; 
however, quantifying the impact of this change in accounting was not practical. 
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TABLE 7 CONTINUED 
 
Panel B continued  
Name of firm 
 Compustat 
fiscal year 
 
Quote from the 10K filings 
 
      
Very few firms quantified the SOP 97-2 implementation effects  
Reynolds & Reynolds  1998  The implementation of this pronouncement reduced the Automotive Group's computer systems 
products revenues $17,936, gross profit $11,205, operating income $10,624 and net income $6,204 
or $.08 per diluted share during the six months ended March 31, 1999 
 
ASA International Ltd.  1998  The effect of adopting SOP 97-2 on the 1998 Statement of Operations was to decrease income 
before income taxes and net income by approximately $446,000 and $174,000, respectively. 
 
Clickaction Inc.  1998  Under SOP 97-2, the Company is required to defer revenue related to certain promotional product 
offerings based on the relative fair value of undelivered products included in the promotional 
offering. As of  December 31, 1998, the Company recorded approximately $599,000 of deferred 
revenue related to such  promotional product offerings 
 
 
A few firms restated their accounts due to late implementation of SOP 97-2 rules  
Cape Systems Group Inc.  1998 and 1999  The Company has adjusted its accounting for revenue recognition of certain software license fees 
and related post contract customer support revenue for the years ended July 31, 1999 and 1998 
because the Company determined that information with respect to separate pricing for each of the 
multiple elements is not available. 
 
Peritus Software 
Services Inc. 
 1998  The balance of the 1998 restatements relate primarily to the Company's incorrect interpretation of 
the complex provisions regarding recognition of revenue for combined software/services 
arrangements under Statement of Position ("SOP") 97- 2, "Software Revenue Recognition," 
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